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TEACHING NOTES 
Mozambique: A Chance for Peace  
 
Ann L. Phillips∗  
 
 
Objective 
 
Since the end of the Cold War, fragile states present of the greatest challenges to national, re-
gional, and global security. The number of complex operations, or Security, Stability, Transition 
and Reconstruction missions, has grown significantly since the early 1990s. The record of assis-
tance is decidedly mixed. The successes—Namibia, El Salvador and Mozambique—are outnum-
bered by the many efforts that have failed or remain in question. Empirical evidence shows that 
roughly 40 percent of all countries that experience internal conflict succumb to conflict again 
within a decade following a peace settlement.  
 
The high rate of failure in complex operations can be traced to a number of factors: 
1. Inadequate numbers of  personnel who understand the history, culture, tradition, lan-
guage, key actors, and dynamics of the society the international community is trying to as-
sist. 
2. The failure to do a well-informed strategic assessment of the situation prior to develop-
ing a strategic plan. The UN peace support mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo; 
U.S.-led missions in Iraq and Afghanistan; and U.S. missions to Somalia, Lebanon, and 
Haiti all underscore the heavy cost to host country citizens and to mission personnel when 
a fairly sophisticated strategic assessment does not inform strategy. 
Mozambique is one of the few countries that has made a successful transition from civil war to 
sustainable peace, stability, reconstruction, and development, despite the presence of many fac-
tors found in other cases that have failed.  
 
Target Audience  
 
This case is relevant for:  practitioners and academics; policymakers and strategic planning staffs 
engaged in complex operations; and students of security studies, political economy, political sci-
ence, international relations, development studies, and peace and conflict resolution studies.  
 
Running the Case 
 
                                                 
∗
 Anne L. Phillips is Director of Studies, Program for Security, Stability, Transition and Recon-
struction (SSTaR) and Professor of National Security Studies at the George C. Marshall Center 
in Garmisch, Germany. 
  
The primary value of the case study is to educate participants in essential components of draft 
peace agreements and strategic plans through a comparison of real documents and the official 
record of the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ). This exercise can be bro-
ken out into three parts:  
 
1. Participants should first write a strategic assessment of the situation in 1992 based on “the 
story” provided in the case.  This is a short document that maps out the current situation, includ-
ing key national, regional, and international stakeholders—their motives and incentives; and 
identifies the root causes of the conflict, including: 
 
–structural factors 
–resources to support conflict 
–conflict entrepreneurs 
–triggering events  
2. Based on the strategic assessment, participants should draft the key points that a peace 
agreement should include and be able to explain why. The drafts can then be compared for simi-
larities to and differences with the General Peace Agreement (GPA). 
3. Develop a Strategic Plan for the UN mission. Participant strategies should be discussed on 
their own merits and then compared with ONUMOZ. 
The strategic plan is based on the strategic assessment and draft peace agreement. It includes the 
following:   
 
• Strategic Objectives 
 
-A statement of the strategic end-state 
-A clear definition of what constitutes success-Specific benchmarks to be achieved to 
achieve success 
-What are the immediate priorities and what are the subsequent priorities? 
 
• Key Planning Assumptions  
–e.g., consent of parties  
–role of regional and other actors  
–time 
–resources 
–risk assessment 
–other?  
–of the mission 
–of the international community, regional groups, bilateral partners 
 
  
Operational planning and a budget plan will be developed later, based on the strategic assess-
ment and strategic plan.  
 
• Constraints 
–time 
–resources 
–risk assessment 
–other? 
 
 • Responsibilities: 
 
–of the mission 
–of the international community, regional groups, bilateral partners 
 
Operational planning and a budget plan will be developed later, based on the strategic assess-
ment and strategic plan. 
 
Structuring the Exercise  
The structure will depend upon the participants as well as the length of any class period. 
It is recommended that the exercise be conducted in two parts. The longer version is preferred, 
because complex operations often suffer from a poor or nonexistent strategic assessment. From 
this, an equally flawed strategic plan might follow. A shorter option, however, is provided.  
 
For both versions, include this exercise: 
 
Your Task 
 
A peace agreement to end civil war is an important first step, but many peace agreements fail. 
Empirical evidence shows that conflict resumes within a decade in 40 percent of countries 
emerging from civil war.1   How do you strengthen and sustain the peace? What must the United 
Nations do to support the peace?  
The Secretary-General of the United Nations understands the importance of supporting peace 
in Mozambique. He has selected you for a team to develop a strategy for a UN Peacekeeping 
Mission. Your work is essential in order to win the approval of the UN Security Council for a 
mission to effectively support peace; to help implement an agreement, once it is reached; and to 
provide a foundation for sustainable security and reconstruction 
You must first draft a strategic assessment of the situation; second, outline the essential points 
for a successful peace agreement; and third, draft a strategic design for a UN mission in Mozam-
bique.  
 
1. Develop a Strategic Assessment This is a short document that: 
• Maps out the current situation, including key national, regional, and international 
stakeholders and their motives and incentives  
  
• Identifies the root causes of the conflict including: 
–structural factors 
–resources to support conflict 
–conflict entrepreneurs 
–triggering events  
• Considers possible options and scenarios  
• Recommends what kind of Peace Support Operation is needed under current circum-
stances, e.g., Chapter VI or Chapter VII of the UN Charter (See Appendices)  
• Identifies opportunities and risks  
 
2. Outline Key Components Required for a Successful Peace Agreement Based on your stra-
tegic assessment, draft the key points that a peace agreement for Mozambique in 1992 should 
include.  
 
3. Develop a Strategic Plan for the UN Mission This document is based on the strategic as-
sessment and draft peace agreement. It should include: 
  
• Strategic objectives 
 
–a statement of the strategic end-state 
–a clear definition of what constitutes success 
–specific benchmarks to secure success 
–priorities—What are the immediate priorities? What are the subsequent priorities?  
 
• Key planning assumptions  
–consent of parties  
–role of regional and other actors  
 
• Constraints 
–timing 
–resources 
–risk assessment 
–other?  
 
• Responsibilities 
–of the mission 
–of the international community, regional groups, bilateral partners 
  
 
Operational planning and a budget plan will be developed later, based on your strategic assess-
ment and strategic plan.  
 
 
Long version  
This can be done over two days or on a weekend—however, there is a risk that participants will 
look up the GPA and UN mission docs and merely replicate them.  
1. Participants should divide into groups of four to five to develop a strategic assessment 
and recommendations for an effective peace agreement—all based on the information 
provided by the case. 
–The amount of time required will depend upon the reading speed and analytical skills 
of the participants 
–Recommend 4 hours: one hour to read and discuss the case material, one hour to pre-
pare the brief; one hour for briefs (depending upon size of class), and one hour for dis-
cussion as a class. This time can be reduced by having participants read all background 
materials prior to class. 
–Participants should select a spokesperson to brief the entire class on their strategic as-
sessment and recommendations for a peace agreement. 
 
–Briefs should be limited to 10–12 minutes for each group to avoid description and re-
telling the story. 
–Recommend that briefers not be in the room for the other briefs. 
–BREAK after all groups have briefed. 
–The General Peace Agreement text (full) or summary (Appendix II in the teaching 
notes) should be distributed to participants during break. 
–45–60 minutes for discussing the briefs and comparing proposals for a peace agreement 
with the actual document. 
2. Participants can stay in the same groups or form new groups to develop a strategic plan 
–The amount of time required will depend upon the analytical skills of the participants 
–Recommend 3 hours—one hour to prepare the strategic plan, one hour to brief, one 
hour for discussion as a class. 
–BREAK after briefs 
–ONUMOZ mission information should be distributed to participants during break. 
(Appendix III in teaching notes.) 
–60 minutes for discussion of briefs and comparison with actual UN mission. 
3. An epilogue follows “Specific Issues for Discussion” in the teaching notes. It provides infor-
mation on the challenges, responsibilities, accomplishments, and less successful aspects of 
  
UNOMOZ as well as lessons learned and how Mozambique has fared following the completion 
of the UN mission in December 1994. The instructor may distribute it following the briefs and 
discussion to bring participants up to date.  
- Develop a strategic assessment: Since the chronology of events is well developed in the 
case, start with a “rapid fire” discussion. In quick order, run through the bulleted list. Board work 
will be essential to get all of the points down. Do not get bogged down in details. however, ex-
pect disagreement on key issues such as root causes of the conflict, main actors and incentives, 
and opportunities and risks. This type of debate is a valuable exercise. 
 
 
Short Version The length of time you commit to this discussion can be customized according to 
your needs. Participants must read the case materials carefully—background information, the 
story, and the task description—before class.  
 
First Session 
 
1. Develop a strategic assessment: Since the chronology of events is well developed in the case, 
start with a “rapid fire” discussion. In quick order, run through the bulleted list. Board work will 
be essential to get all of the points down. Do not get bogged down in details; however, expect 
disagreement on key issues such as root causes of the conflict, main actors and incentives, and 
opportunities and risks. This is valuable. 
2. Next, through questions, have the students outline key components for developing a peace 
agreement, which is task 2. 
3. When these tasks are completed, break the class into three groups, with each group responsible 
for one of the following subtasks:  
• Strategic objectives and assumptions  
• Constraints  
• Responsibilities 
Each group should have a leader. Each group should be given access to a whiteboard or display 
board for presentation to the class. 
  
 
Second Session  
 
At the end of the first session, hand out the epilogue to the participants to be read before the sec-
ond session. Also hand out a copy of the actual peace agreement as an assigned reading. In the 
case debrief, ask them what they learned from the exercise, especially after reading the actual 
agreement. 
 
The purpose of this shorter exercise is to build the analytical skills of the class, not to recreate the 
actual agreement.. Based on their reading, are the students able to  identify the actors, the issues, 
etc.?  Distinct ideas on what is most important may emerge, and should be integrated into the 
discussion.   
  
 
Specific Issues for Discussion 
 
• What was the conflict in Mozambique all about? It is often characterized as a proxy war in the 
East-West conflict. Under the leadership of Samora Machel, the first president of independent 
Mozambique, Frelimo was transformed into a Marxist-Leninist party. In response, Dhlakama’s 
rallying cry was, “We are against communism, we are against socialism, and we are for capital-
ism.”  
–But the actual situation was much more complicated as the story shows. In fact, 
Renamo never really had a compelling vision or political program for the country.  
• Often a change of leadership through death or defeat is pivotal to a shift from war 
to peace. This was only partially true in Mozambique. The death of Machel al-
lowed Chissano to accelerate a tentative reform program begun by his predeces-
sor.  
 
–Nonetheless, Chissano and Dhlakama had led the two opposing forces for a long time. 
It was these two antagonists who ultimately signed a peace agreement.  
 
• Why did the first attempt at peace in 1984 fail? 
 
–Due to timing, incentives, and bad faith. Other factors? 
–Although the government of Mozambique adhered to the terms of the Nkomati Agree-
ment, South Africa did not. Why not? What role did South Africa’s interest in destabiliz-
ing Mozambique exert? 
 
Turning Points 
 
• Offensive and counteroffensive in 1987: Following its expulsion from Malawi, Renamo 
launched a major offensive along the Zambezi River valley. Success would have divided the 
country, allowing Renamo to set up its own government in the north. The Mozambique armed 
forces, supported by Zimbabwean and Tanzanian troops, marshaled a successful counteroffen-
sive, pushing back Renamo and its South African allies, widely regarded as a critical turning 
point in the conflict. The result was a military stalemate. 
 
• Drought: Expanding drought made it much more difficult for Renamo to support itself, since 
external support had been largely eliminated. Renamo’s brutality toward the local population in-
creased. 
 
• 1987–88—Reforms launched by President Chissano opened up political and economic space 
and led the way toward a market democracy. The reforms diffused some of the opposition inter-
nally as well as regionally 
 
  
• 1988—President Chissano offered unconditional amnesty to Renamo fighters  
 
–No significant response, because the overture was not trusted. However, a few were drawn 
away from the insurgency. 
 
Shifting Sides 
 
• Rhodesian shift to majority rule ended that county’s support for Renamo. Renamed Zim-
babwe, the country became a strong supporter of the government of Mozambique and played 
an essential role in helping that government survive militarily. Later, President Mugabe 
played important role in peace negotiations.  
 
• British company Lonrho (“Tiny Rowland”) payments to Renamo first supported war  
 
–Lonrho later employed its money and connections to support peace, once further con-
flict in Mozambique became harmful to its interests. 
 
• Many peace agreements fail. Signing a peace agreement is only a first step, albeit an impor-
tant one. Indeed, approximately 40 percent of countries that have experienced internal con-
flict return to conflict within a decade. The failure of the Nkomati Agreement (1984) fits this 
pattern. Why did it fail? 
 
• Why did Chissano and Dhlakama turn to peace? How did they succeed in bringing their two 
organizations along? Exhaustion, stalemate, and shifting regional and international environ-
ments, as well as a handful of critical actors converged to push the participants to produce the 
General Peace Agreement. No single defining moment or act of heroism stands out. Frelimo 
had lost popular support because of its economic and social policies as well as its inability to 
provide public security. Renamo’s public support was always questionable because of its for-
eign origins and extreme brutality against civilians. Neither side trusted the other. In sum, 
conditions were not overly auspicious at the time the peace agreement was signed. 
 
• In other countries, such as Northern Ireland, hardliners have broken off from the main or-
ganizations to continue the struggle. In Mozambique, although acts of violence continued, 
there was no organized movement to continue the war. 
 
• Another contributing factor may have been the nature of Renamo. There is no indication that 
it was animated by any compelling convictions, ideology, or vision for the country. Hence, 
with sufficient guarantees for safety, the Renamo leadership was willing to be bought. Mon-
ey paid a significant role in winning Renamo adherence to peace. 
 
• The General Peace Agreement makes no mention of economic reconstruction, considered 
essential for sustainable peace and stability. Indeed, Paul Collier, a world reknowned eco-
nomic at Oxford University, regards security and reviving the economy as the two most im-
portant things to do in order to sustain peace. ONUMOZ did not include economic recon-
struction, either. Demobilizing fighters without providing other alternatives is often a recipe 
for renewed conflict. In this case, donors filled the gap by providing generous development 
  
assistance. Could the omission of the economic component have been a fatal mistake, had the 
donors not moved quickly? 
 
• The ONUMOZ mandate was quite weak and limited, yet it managed to succeed against sig-
nificant odds. Why? 
 
• A central discussion in stabilization-reconstruction missions today is the UN and donors’ en-
durance and commitment to the long-term. The UN and international community participants 
generally are criticized regularly for leaving too soon. The ONUMOZ mission, however, was 
in place only for two years. It was not extended. Should the issue of duration be revisited? 
 
 
 
Additional Materials/ Resources 
 
Joaquim Alberto Chissano  
 
BBC News, October 22, 2007. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7056229.stm 
The Independent, “Democrat among the despots,” October 23, 2007. 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/joaquim-chissano-democrat-among-the-
despots-397608.html 
BBC News, “Mozambique ex-leader wins prize,” October 22, 2007. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7056159.stm  
 
Afonso Dhlakama  
International Crisis Group. http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4225  
New Internationalist #374, “The Lessons of War” (December 2004): p. 5. 
Transformation 10, William Minter, “Inside Renamo: As Described by Ex-Participants” 
(1989)  
 
 
 
UN PEACEKEEPING: Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter 
 
 
UN peacekeeping is a unique and dynamic instrument developed by the organization as a way 
to help countries torn by conflict create the conditions for lasting peace. The first UN peacekeep-
ing mission was established in 1948, when the Security Council authorized the deployment of 
UN military observers to the Middle East to monitor the armistice agreement between Israel and 
its Arab neighbors. Since then, there have been a total of sixty-four UN peacekeeping operations 
around the world, as of the end of 2010. 
 
The term “peacekeeping” is not found in the United Nations Charter and defies simple definition. 
Dag Hammarskjöld, the second UN Secretary-General, referred to it as belonging to “chapter six 
and a half” of the charter, placing it between traditional methods of resolving disputes peace-
fully, such as negotiation and mediation under Chapter VI, and more forceful action as 
  
ly, such as negotiation and mediation under Chapter VI, and more forceful action as authorized 
under Chapter VII. 
 
Under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, UN troops may use force only for self-defense. Under 
Chapter VII, Article 42 permits UN forces to “take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may 
be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.” Although neither Chapter 
VI nor Chapter VII explicitly mentions peacekeeping or peace enforcement, this language has 
been interpreted as permitting the use of force beyond self-defense to achieve the mission’s ob-
jectives. 
Source: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping. 
 
 
Armon, Jeremy, Dylan Hendrickson, and Alex Vines, eds. 1998. The Mozambican Peace Process 
in Perspective.” Accord.   This special edition includes the historical context, ideological shifts 
and economic imperatives among neighboring states. It also examines the quest for reconcilia-
tion, the “business” of peace, and financial incentives and the Mozambican settlement.  
 
Hall, Margaret. 1990. The Mozambican National Resistance Movement (RENAMO): A Study in 
the Destruction of an African Country. Africa 60(1).  
This paper argues that Renamo has taken on local roots, despite its external origins and employ-
ment as a tool against Mozambique. Renamo has been able to feed on peasant discontent with 
Frelimo economic policies. Still more important are the structural weaknesses of the Mozambi-
can state and the degree of violent coercion Renamo employs against the civilian population. The 
article summarizes the origins and spread of the conflict, Renamo’s organization and aims, and 
the processes at work on the ground.  
 
Junne, Gerd, and Willemijn Verkoren, eds. 2005. Postconflict Development: Meeting New Chal-
lenges. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.  This edited volume examines multiple dimensions of post-
conflict development and illustrates these with several cases. Of particular interest for this exer-
cise are chapters 1–3 and 14, “Bringing it all together: a case study of Mozambique.”  
 
Laremont, Ricardo Rene. 2002. The Causes of War and the Consequences of Peacekeeping in 
Africa. Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann.  
 
 
Msabaha, Ibrahim. 1995. Negotiating an End to Mozambique’s Murderous Rebellion in Elusive 
Peace: Negotiating and End to Civil Wars. Ed. I. William Zartman. Washington, DC: The 
Brookings Institution, pp. 201–230.  This chapter examines the applicability of general negotia-
tion theory with relation to the Mozambican conflict.  It aims toimprove the analysis of negotia-
tions for academicians, and the practice of conflict resolution. It also seeks to contribute to poli-
cymakers’ understanding of the Mozambican conflict and the methods used to terminate the con-
flict in order to promote peace, security, and development in Mozambique. 
 
Paris, Roland. 2004. At War’s End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict. New York: Cambridge 
University Press. Paris, Roland, and Timothy D. Sisk. 2009. The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: 
Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations. Routledge.  This book explores 
  
the contradictions that emerge in international state building efforts in war-torn societies. Since 
the end of the Cold War, more than twenty major peace operations have been deployed to coun-
tries emerging from internal conflicts. This book argues that international efforts to construct ef-
fective, legitimate governmental structures in these countries are necessary but fraught with con-
tradictions and vexing dilemmas. Drawing on the latest scholarly research on postwar peace op-
erations, the volume addresses cutting-edge issues of state building, including coordination, local 
ownership, security, elections, constitution making, and delivery of development aid; features 
contributions by leading and up-and-coming scholars; provides empirical case studies including 
Afghanistan, Cambodia, Croatia, Kosovo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, South Africa, and others; and 
presents policy-relevant findings of use to students and policymakers alike. 
.  
 
Weinstein, Jeremy M. 2007. Inside Rebellion: the Politics of Insurgent Violence. New York: 
Cambridge University Press.  This book presents a theory to account for the different strategies 
pursued by rebel groups in civil war, explaining why patterns of insurgent violence vary so much 
across conflicts. It does so by examining the membership, structure, and behavior of four insur-
gent movements in Uganda, Mozambique, and Peru. Drawing on interviews with nearly two 
hundred combatants and civilians who experienced violence firsthand, it shows that rebels’ strat-
egies depend on how difficult it is to launch a rebellion. Weinstein demonstrates how the envi-
ronment in which rebellion emerges determines the patterns of violence that civilians experience.  
 
Zartman, I. William, ed. 1995. Collapsed States: the Disintegration and Resto-ration of Legiti-
mate Authority. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. 
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 Anke Hoeffler, “State Failure and Conflict Recurrence” in Peace and Conflict 2010, Executive 
Summary, J. Joseph Hewitt, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, and Ted Robert Gurr, eds. (College Park, MD: 
University of Maryland, Center for International Development and Conflict Management, 2010), 
p. 23. 
